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 In this issue, we are pleased to offer the third of 
three parts of a major work by Elias Capriles offering a 
reframing of transpersonal theory from the perspective 
of Dzogchen Buddhism. His response to the field focuses 
specifically on critiques of the theories of Ken Wilber, 
Stan Grof, and Michael Washburn. In the course of 
expounding Dzogchen doctrines and explicating these 
critiques of leading transpersonal theorists, Capriles 
touches on a rich array of philosophical and psychological 
topics. As a practitioner of Dzogchen for more than 
thirty years, he brings both the articulate mind of a 
scholar and the experienced voice of a practitioner to his 
subject.
 Although Capriles’ words would be different, 
the thrust of his paper might be summarized something 
like this: Transpersonal psychology is valuable because 
it acknowledges and studies self-healing states of mind 
not recognized by standard psychology. As such, it is 
able to counter the tendency to pathologize spiritual 
and transpersonal experiences. In this way, the field may 
provide important support and context for individuals 
undergoing such experiences, and perhaps save them 
from unnecessary and therefore possibly detrimental 
psychiatric treatment. While transpersonal psychology 
thus has recognized the existence of higher and holotropic 
states of awareness, it is not yet able to discriminate 
adequately between the many different variations of 
such states. This leads to a number of problems. Perhaps 
the most vexing of these is that theorists within the field 
tend to misidentify as nirvana states that do not at all 
correspond with the characteristics of true Awakening. 
This does not invalidate transpersonal theories, but it 
does suggest that the works of major theorists such as 
Wilber, Grof, and Washburn should be reconsidered in 
this light.
 From the perspective of Dzogchen Buddhism, 
which Capriles sees as the highest vehicle within 
Buddhism and the most direct path to Awakening, 
Wilber’s model is the most problematic. Wilber, 
according to Capriles, misunderstands Awakening as 
a stage-like process in which a subject moves beyond 
conventional levels of development, when in fact it is a 
spontaneous unveiling of supreme reality in which the 
separate subject no longer exists. This Awakening is not 
the product of a process and therefore, when it occurs, it 
does so without reference to any stage-like developmental 
schema. Even if Wilber’s model is compared with the 
levels of realization in known Paths of Awakening, 
which represent something quite different than a process 
of development as ordinarily conceived, the stages that 
Wilber proposed have no correspondence in content or 
sequence with those levels.
 From the perspective of Western psychology, 
Wilber’s effort to distill a variety of paths into a single 
model can be seen as a reasonable goal. Capriles 
concludes that what his visionary approach misses, 
however, is the great diversity that actually exists among 
different paths. For example, the state of samadhi sought 
by practitioners of Yoga results in a deep absorption in 
which active knowing and awareness of the sensory 
continuum cease. One is no longer able to function 
practically in the world. By contrast, both sensory 
and cognitive processes continue in nirvana, and the 
practitioner is not only able to function, but does so 
in enhanced ways. What differs is that the distinctions 
between subject and object, knower and known, have 
been absolutely eradicated. In a nirvanic state, there is 
not a subject who experiences nirvana: there is simply 
the arising of apparent yet transparent phenomena 
within the presence of supreme reality. Furthermore, 
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rather than bypassing the realm of ordinary sensory 
appearances, nirvana offers the opportunity for skillful 
and compassionate engagement with the suffering of the 
world. Given the vast difference between these spiritual 
goals—which are just two of many such different 
goals—any effort to synthesize them will necessarily be 
unsuccessful. 
 Capriles argues that, if Wilber’s framework 
is deconstructed in this way, then concepts that rely 
on this framework should also be re-examined. For 
example, in light of a Dzogchen view of Awakening, 
neither the notion of a pre / trans fallacy, nor the debate 
over whether spiritual development is an ascending 
or descending process, has significance. Awakening, 
from Capriles’ perspective, is the unraveling of the very 
context within which pre / trans and ascent / descent 
derive meaning. For all of these reasons, he argues that 
is difficult to conclude that the conceptual structure 
developed by Wilber has any meaningful application 
other than as a testament to one man’s eloquent, but 
ultimately flawed, effort to wrest simple truth out of a 
complex world. 
 Grof ’s work, on the other hand, needs to be 
considered differently, according to Capriles. Grof ’s 
concept of systems	 of	 condensed	 experience, or COEX 
systems, suggests that clusters of emotionally relevant 
memories are stored together, constituting the deep 
woundings that distort personality and behavior, and 
that these clusters may be accessed and deep self-healing 
processes triggered through the therapeutic use of LSD 
or the practice of intense breathing techniques. Capriles 
agrees that such an idea might well find a place within 
a more inclusive psychology that seeks to trigger deep, 
self-healing processes. However, Capriles thinks it is 
crucial to distinguish between these intense self-healing 
states that Grof called holotropic states—or states 
tending toward wholeness—and the nirvanic states 
of Awakening. For example, one type of holotropic 
experience involves states in which the individual has 
an experience of connectedness, even of identity, with 
immeasurably larger aspects of life. While this is a type 
of peak	 experience, it is not Awakening for the simple 
reason that there is still a subject who feels at one, and 
an object—a cosmos—with which that subject feels 
connected and identified. The disparity between such 
states and nirvana can be highlighted by considering the 
other type of holotropic experience: those that involve 
terror, despair, guilt, or other types of extreme emotional 
suffering. These states involve great discomfiture precisely 
because the mental subject has not dissolved. Since such 
experiences are seen by Grof as on a continuum with 
experiences of cosmic oneness, Capriles concludes that 
none of these states constitutes nirvana. 
 In addition, Capriles points out that Grof made 
no proper distinction between states obtained through the 
use of psychedelic substances and those gained through 
effective spiritual practice. As such, he implied that 
such drugs may promote genuine spiritual development. 
However, Capriles asserts that the use of such chemicals 
brings the user no closer to Awakening, and carries the 
risk of producing dangerous psychotic states. A similar 
issue pertains to Grof ’s work on the study of spiritual	
emergence and spiritual	 emergency. Capriles recognizes 
that this valuable initiative can provide much-needed 
support for individuals immersed in crises, increasing 
their chances of emerging more whole from the difficult 
passage; however, he rejects that such episodes are markers 
on a path leading to Awakening. Capriles’ consistent issue 
with Grof ’s work, then, is that holotropic states, drug-
induced psychotic experiences, and mental crises arising 
from a variety of sources are not adequately identified 
by Grof as processes that happen entirely within the 
conditioned mind. Capriles emphasizes that, although 
some of these may be beneficial for promoting valuable 
self-healing, self-healing should be clearly delineated as a 
process that is wholly distinct from Awakening.
 Capriles acknowledges that Washburn’s model 
is intuitively closer to Buddhist concepts in that the 
spiritual journey is not seen as a path of development, 
but instead one in which the ego returns to the Ground 
from which it arose, and from which it has become 
estranged. Furthermore, Washburn seems to trace a 
quite genuine process of inner integration in which 
mind and body are reunited in a new and higher form of 
psychic organization, and finally he does not claim that 
this process leads to Awakening and admits that it only 
rarely leads to mystical illumination. Capriles concludes 
that all of this makes Washburn’s theoretical structure 
more humble and more transparent in its claims.  But, 
from Capriles’ Dzogchen perspective, Washburn’s major 
shortfall is not in what he admits within his theories, 
but in what he excludes. Because Washburn frames 
engagement with spirituality as a journey that begins 
with the nascent ego of the infant, and ends with an ego 
that has become an instrument of the Ground, Capriles 
concludes this implies that the goal and aim of human 
spirituality pertains entirely to the domain of the ego. 
This position effectively excludes the Path of Awakening, 
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in which the ego is seen as not merely brought to heel, 
but utterly eradicated. As such, Capriles sees Washburn’s 
system not as inaccurate in its content, but distorted by 
its limited context.
 In a similar sense, Capriles concludes that 
Washburn falls prey to the common transpersonal 
tendency to oversimplify spiritual processes and rejects 
Washburn’s suggestion that all forms of meditation 
may be usefully classified within just two categories—
receptive meditation and concentrative meditation. This 
is because, for example, one practice of what might be 
called receptive meditation may have as its goal something 
radically different than other practices included in the 
same category, and might in fact even be more closely 
related in terms of its goal to some concentrative practices 
than to other receptive practices. For this reason, the 
simple distinction between receptivity and concentration 
may be no more helpful for distinguishing between the 
many forms of meditation than classifying people by 
whether their navels go in or out.
 In his critiques of Wilber, Grof, and Washburn, 
Capriles writes as a traditionalist, and the Dzogchen 
teachings of his lineage—passed to him through 
Chögyal Namkhai Norbu Rinpoche—serve as the 
unwavering reference point for his engagement with 
the transpersonal field. He presents his perspective as 
metatranspersonal because he considers the doctrines and 
practices of Dzogchen as belonging to an entirely higher 
level than transpersonal theory. He holds Dzogchen as 
a path that leads to true Awakening into the perfectly 
nondual states of nirvana, while he sees transpersonal 
theories as generally reflecting experiences that do not 
reach above the higher levels of samsara, the states of the 
relative and conditioned mind.
 In the spirit of a traditionalist, Capriles’ thread 
of criticism closely follows the contours of Dzogchen 
doctrine. Those aspects of theory that are consistent with 
Dzogchen are praised, those that conflict are denounced, 
and the positions of Dzogchen are frequently reasserted. 
Yet the discussion flows into numerous fascinating and 
highly-informative digressions that, together with the 
central critical engagement with transpersonal theorists, 
challenge the transpersonal project in refreshing and 
stimulating ways. 
 The topics engaged in this paper are complex, 
and Capriles’ voice as a detail-focused non-native English 
speaker has its own particular flavor that cannot easily be 
divorced from its core content. For these reasons, certain 
idiosyncracies and deviations from the standard APA 
style of the journal have been allowed and there has been 
minimal editorial input on anything other than some 
modest attempts at standardization. We consequently 
recognize this piece, and the previous pieces written 
by Capriles in this journal, as likely difficult to read. 
However, we think it presents an important substantive 
challenge to much of contemporary transpersonal 
studies and hope readers will find this both edifying 
and thought provoking.  As editors, we ourselves have at 
times struggled with understanding some of it intricacies, 
and do not claim to fully comprehend all contained 
within, but we unwaveringly conclude that it was a 
struggle well worthwhile.  In this sense, sometimes one 
reads a paper and is left with more of an intuitive sense 
of its importance, despite not being able to rationally 
assimilate and accommodate its entirety: such is this 
work by Capriles.  
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